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Abstract 
The research process underpinning this article was focused on casting some light on factors influencing the 
way in which developing countries can enhance linkages between Transnational Corporation (TNC) Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) firms and domestic small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  It sought to do this 
through identifying the major lessons from SME-TNC linkage programmes from three South African 
Development Community (SADC) case studies: Mozambique and the Mozal aluminium smelter; Lesotho and 
the clothing and textile investment related to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and South 
Africa’s experience with SME suppliers and Toyota.  The process of securing developmental impacts from 
FDI for developing countries has been a considerable challenge for many countries and has become a 
greater imperative in a context of relative declines in official development assistance in the past decade.  
Other authors have explained how FDI can compensate for domestic savings shortfalls and reduce BOP 
imbalances.  This study tries to explore some ways in which FDI can contribute to lasting structural change in 
developing country production and productivity dynamics.  
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1.  Introduction 
The creation of Foreign Direct Investment or FDI-related linkages within host country economies has been 
an issue of discussion in the development literature for some decades.  However, as FDI flows have begun 
to outstrip Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows to developing countries, the importance of 
increasing the potential sustainable developmental benefits of FDI has taken on a new significance 
(UNCTAD, 2007: 34). This includes the need for developing countries to reduce pressure on their current 
accounts through external capital inflows and increased exports, to increase public revenues through direct 
and indirect taxation, to enhance technology transfers and employment creation, and to maximise knowledge 
spill-over effects from FDI through the creation of Transnational Corporation (or TNC) and small and medium 
enterprise (or SME) linkages.  
While acknowledging the potential beneficial impact of FDI in all these areas, both scholars and 
policymakers have recognised that such an impact is not automatic. Experience shows that the robustness 
of local economic development frameworks and related governance procedures is an important factor in 
securing such benefits, as can be the nature and approach of the TNC itself. In this sense, a systemic policy 
approach is needed, combining different levels of policy interventions and addressing both the area of FDI 
attraction and of SME development in an integrated manner. 
This article provides an overview of the experience of business linkage activities between small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in three Southern African Development 
Community countries (South Africa, Mozambique and Lesotho).2  In a context where TNCs dominate global 
trade and FDI, often presiding over global value chains, the creation of linkages between domestic SMEs 
and TNCs provides some significant growth opportunities to upgrade the supply and business capacity of 
local firms.  In addition to the three country case studies, the article also provides an analysis of lessons to 
be drawn from the experiences.  The article concludes with some limited reflections on the way forward for 
SADC countries addressing linkage formation between domestic SMEs and TNCs. 
                                                                  
2 The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was created in 1992 to further socio-economic cooperation and integration, as well as 
political and security cooperation among 14 southern African states. It includes Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), created in 1980, was the forerunner of the socio-
economic cooperation leg of today's SADC. 
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2.  Recent FDI trends in the SADC region 
FDI flows to the African continent reached record levels of US$36 billion in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007: 34).  
UNCTAD’s World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2007) outlines how this figure was heavily influenced by the 
global boom in many commodities which stimulated considerable extractive industry investment globally and 
also on the continent. 
In the last decade, FDI flows to the SADC region as a whole have been showing a general growing trend in 
absolute terms, from a very low base of US$269-million in 1993 rising to a US$7,502-million in 2005 
(Muradzikwa, 2002; UNCTAD, 2007).  Such flows, however, have been generally erratic, exacerbated by 
irregular and often large extractive industries projects, by oscillating foreign investment activities by South 
African firms and by mergers and acquisitions carried out in the South African market (UNCTAD, 2007).  For 
example, according to UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2007, in 2006 absolute FDI inflows to the South 
African Development Community (SADC) region showed a drastic decline from 2005 levels and a substantial 
rise in outflows3 (see Table 1).  It is also notable that, despite absolute increases, SADC’s relative 
contribution to total FDI inflows to Africa is somewhat lower than it was a decade ago.  Analysis of UNCTAD 
data (UNCTAD, 2007) shows that in 1995 SADC contributed over 40% on Africa FDI inflows whilst in recent 
years this has been closer to 25%. 
Table 1: SADC FDI inflows and outflows: 2004-2006 (US$ millions) 
FDI category 
1993-2000 (average 
annual SADC flows) 
2004 (annual total) 2005 (annual total) 2006 (annual total) 
Inflows 2,970 4,057 7,502 861 
Outflows  1,374 1,222 6,792 
Sources: UNCTAD (2000) as quoted in Muradzikwa (2002); UNCTAD, WIR (2007) 
When examining aggregate FDI figures, it is important to keep in mind that there is a considerable degree of 
heterogeneity within the SADC regional grouping.  For instance, the challenges faced by small countries or 
land-locked countries such as Swaziland can be very different from those of more populous or coastal 
countries such as Angola, with very different economic profiles. This becomes apparent when comparing the 
FDI inflows of the three case study countries under review (see Table 2).  
                                                                  
3 Linked to a South African firm purchasing foreign mining operations. 
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Table 2: FDI Inflows 2004-2006 in SADC countries, Africa, Developing Countries and the World (US$ millions) 
Country / region 1995 2004 2005 2006 
Angola 472 1,449 -1,303 -1,140 
Botswana 70 392 281 274 
Congo -22 -13 724 344a 
Lesotho 23 53 57 57 
Madagascar 10 95 86 230 
Malawi 6 22 27 30 
Mauritius 13 14 42 105 
Mozambique 45 245 108 154 
Namibia 153 226 348 327 
South Africa 1,241 799 6,251 -323 
Swaziland 43 71 - 50 36 
United Republic of Tanzania 150 331 448 377 
Zambia 37 364 380 350 
Zimbabwe 118 9 103 40 
SADC* 2,359 4,057 7,502 861 
Africa 5,655 18,018 29,648 35,544 
Developing countries 115,369 283,030 314,316 279,070 
World 342,592 742,143 945,795 1,305,852 
Note: * Using the 2008 membership of SADC 
Source: UNCTAD, WIR (2007) 
The following sections provide an overview of three case studies examining the degree and nature of TNC-
SME linkages in the SADC region: South African Automotives, Mozambique’s Mozal Project; and Lesotho’s 
textile and apparel sectors.  The field research took place between 2006 and early 2008. 
In all cases, a series of interviews were conducted with TNC firms, local SMEs, government officials and 
government funded agencies, as well as with a variety of independent experts.4 The material gathered from 
interviews was supplemented by relevant published reports.  
                                                                  
4 The numbers of interviews conducted, using an open ended questionnaire, ranged from more than 20 for South Africa to around 10 each for Mozambique and Lesotho. The 
authors are appreciative of the support of national governments, organisations and businesses that made time and information available in support of the research. 
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3.  Local suppliers in South Africa’s 
automobile sector: networking to benchmark 
and upgrade performance 
The first case study examined is that relating to small and medium firms supplying the South African plant of 
Toyota.  The case is of interest in that it touches on three key intersecting themes that of some relevance to 
developing countries.  In the first instance, it presents the experiences of a process where by firms and 
government collaborated in the formation of an industry inter-firm network geared primarily to enhance the 
capacity of existing automotive suppliers to sustain their engagement with major vehicle producers such as 
Toyota. Secondly, the case explores the nature of supply interactions – and therefore linkages - in a sector 
with a value chain that is increasing globalised.  Finally, the case study also reflects on an active industrial 
policy framework and its impact on the creation of linkages. 
South Africa’s automotive sector developed during the last century under a framework of protection, 
supported by direct and indirect subsidies, with the aim of serving the local market.  It was characterised by a 
mix of assembly and production operations generating relatively low volumes of a wide range of vehicles.  In 
1987 the seven automotive plants in the country produced 22 models, which increased to 34 by 1993, with 
total car sales only in the region of 250,000 units (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000: 779).  The sector was 
characterised by low levels of productivity, high production costs and low levels of innovation.5  
The post-1994 trade liberalisation period saw a dramatic reduction in tariff barriers, including a reduction in 
previously high import tariffs on the importation of both vehicles and automotive components.  As explained 
by Lorentzen et al (1994:7), "duty levels on completely built up vehicles (CBUs) fell from 115% in 1995 to 
40% in 2002 and are scheduled to reach 25% by 2012. Tariffs on completely knocked down (CKD) 
components are lower still”. A range of previous subsidy measures, such as the General Export Incentive 
Scheme were also dismantled as the government sought to introduce an industrial policy framework 
compliant, to a large degree, with the country’s obligations under the Uruguay Round.  
Since 1995, South African exports have experienced a 9-fold increase from R4.2 billion to R39.2bn in 2004.  
South Africa’s share of global auto production was 0.61% in 2000 and grew to 0.79% in 2006.  Total vehicle 
production in 2006 was 621,900 units – more than double the units produced in 1999 (Naamsa, 2007).  The 
case study explores the experiences of local suppliers to the largest vehicle producer, namely Toyota, under 
these circumstances. 
                                                                  
5 Information drawn from Robbins, 2005 and Morris and Robbins, 2007 
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3.1 The Motor Industry Development Plan 
Alongside a commitment to trade liberalisation, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has been eager 
to avoid potential pitfalls of de-industrialisation from rapid tariff adjustments. Through a programme known as 
the Motor Industry Development Plan (MIDP), introduced in 1995, the DTI sought to encourage the 
consolidation of domestic production around the output of a reduced range of vehicles (for each Original 
Equipment Manufacturer or OEM) allowing for export-scale production of these vehicles. The MIDP originally 
provided four key sets of incentives (Barnes and Morris, 2000: 800): 
■ A tariff reduction plan for the import of Completely Built-up Units (CBUs) and Completely Knocked-Down 
(CKD) kits;  
■ A duty free allowance for assemblers of 27% of the wholesale value of the vehicle; 
■ A small vehicle incentive in the form of an effective subsidy for the production of a more affordable vehicle 
based on a duty drawback related to the value of the motor vehicle;  
■ The replacement of previous minimum content provisions for OEMs with an import-export complementation 
scheme allowing both automotive and component manufacturers to gain export credits which could in turn be 
used to offset import duties and could also be sold on the open market.  
The impact of the MIDP secured very substantial FDI commitments in the automotive sector. OEMs began, 
one-by-one, to systematically include South Africa into their global operations, while previously South African 
production activities had either been operations under license or had been viewed as somewhat marginal to 
core global operations. Initially, it was the German OEMs that moved to comprehensively reposition the 
production of BMW, Volkswagen (VW) and Daimler (later Daimler-Chrysler).  More recently, United States 
(or US) and Japanese-based OEMs have begun to follow suit.  As Lorentzen et al (2004:2008) outline, "the 
MIDP, together with the depreciation of the Rand from the mid-1990s, turned South Africa into a relatively 
competitive producer of both components and completed vehicles. The contribution of the auto sector to total 
manufacturing sales grew from 9.7% in 1994 to 12.8% in 2003”. The figures below illustrate the growth of 
exports and output, as the MIDP began to take root in South Africa.6 
                                                                  
6 However, in recent years the MIDP has been reviewed and adjusted, and tariffs continued to be reduced, in order to comply with World Trade Organisation (or WTO) commitments. 
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Figure 1: Domestic production local sales, domestic production exports and imports in the South African 
market 
 
Source: Own calculations from National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) www.naamsa.co.za 
However, for components firms the situation became very challenging.  A depressed domestic market, 
extending from the 1990s through to the first couple of years of the new millennium, combined with often 
weak relationships with the headquarters of OEMs present in South Africa left these firms very vulnerable.  
Not only were orders being lost as models previously produced were discontinued, but in many cases 
volumes were under pressure with weak domestic orders.  Furthermore, the entry of OEMs with local 
operations into global supply chains meant a larger emphasis on global sourcing, and consequently many 
local producers operating under license were placed under considerable pressure. However, the 
requirements of the MIDP for local sourcing in order for OEMS to access export markets and a period of 
currency devaluation did allow for some opportunities after in the period after 2000.  In some instances, this 
entailed large foreign component producers entering the domestic production market through acquisitions or 
other forms of partnership such as joint-ventures.  This allowed for the meeting of local content requirements 
and created a platform for some firms to become part of the OEM parent company global sourcing 
arrangements.  Independent South African component producers were also able to use this period to adjust 
to new industry requirements and a considerable number of these also began to see benefits after the lean 
first years of the MIDP. This is reflected in the figures related to growth in output (by value) listed in Figure 2 
below. 
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Figure 2: South African automotive component output by value 
 
Source: Barnes and Johnson (2004: 8) 
3.2 Automotive production in KwaZulu-Natal and the case of Toyota 
As the bulk of Toyota’s South African suppliers in value and volume terms were based in the Province of 
KwaZulu-Natal, the case study took this region as its focus.  In the Province, SMEs made up the greater 
proportion of the auto components firms located in the region.  Traditionally, in automotive supply chains, 
suppliers have been categorised according to three levels: first tier, second tier and third tier.  The specific 
criteria for being identified as forming part of one or other tier are not necessarily fixed, and with Toyota, 
these have changed overtime.  However, those in the first tier are generally assumed to be supplying 
components at scale directly to the OEM production facility, are often involved in sub-assembly and produce 
components seen to be core to the automobile (engines, electronic systems, body sections). These firms 
have often been said to work in much closer partnership with OEMs and operate on longer term more secure 
contracts.  Second tier firms generally supply either the OEM directly or supply critical components to first tier 
firms and are either producers of scale or involved in specialist higher value activities that are needed in 
automotive production.  Third tier firms often supply second or first tier suppliers rather than OEMs directly.  
It is common from them to be producing lower value and lower volume products using technology and 
processes that is not necessarily unique.  They are often subject to much shorter term contract 
arrangements. 
According to Barnes and Johnson (2004), in 2003, 10 firms in KwaZulu-Natal were first tier suppliers, 20 
were second and third tier, and ten supplied the aftermarket, while a range of others supplied into a variety of 
industries.  Figure 3 shows the product profile of these firms. Barnes and Johnston (ibid) point out that some 
second and third tier suppliers were not exclusive auto component firms and produced goods for other 
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sectors, but had the auto sector as a significant, if not the most significant, customer. Most of these firms 
were significant suppliers to the Toyota plant in Durban. 
Figure 3: Profile of KZN component producers by product type, 2003 
 
Source: Barnes and Johnson (2004: 16) 
Although Toyota manufacturing production was, and still is, the largest in the country by some considerable 
margin, the process to transform the Toyota plant in South Africa from a local operation under licence to an 
subsidiary integrated into Toyota’s global operations was somewhat protracted.  This delayed the access of 
most components firms located in the KwaZulu-Natal province to MIDP schemes.7  However, many of these 
firms were also suppliers to other OEMs or to the after-market (spare parts), and this enabled many of them 
to take advantage of some MIDP export subsidies. The possibility of Toyota significantly scaling up local 
production operations in South Africa and of entering Toyota’s global supply chain also attracted a handful of 
TNCs producing auto components on a global scale, such as the catalytic converter manufacturing firm 
Cataler, partially owned by Toyota itself.8 
During the mid 1990s, the decision was taken by the South African owners of Toyota South Africa (TSA) to 
gradually sell their shares to Toyota Manufacturing Corporation (TMC) of Japan.  However, it was not until 
the late 1990s that TSA made clear its intentions and acted to assume a majority holding of TSA and to 
                                                                  
7 License conditions for Toyota South Africa (TSA) from Toyota Manufacturing Corporation Japan stipulated that TSA could only export a limited range of models to a handful of small 
African markets. This resulted in the imposition of severe limitations for TSA in taking advantage of the export-driven benefits of the MIDP. 
8 Many OEMs have encouraged the production catalytic converter manufacture in South Africa as South Africa is a dominant global producer of platinum and palladium, used in the 
catalytic converters. Their relatively high value makes them an attractive component to meet the domestic content requirements included in the MIDP. 
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restructure its operations to take advantage of the MIDP export opportunities.9  This allowed TSA to 
substantially increase its production output with a plant specialised in the full manufacturing of two models 
(Hilux and Corolla) primarily for export.  Through utilising the export credits available from these exports the 
company was able to important a wider range of vehicles to continue competing with other brands in the 
domestic market. 
3.3 The restructuring of Toyota's relationship with its suppliers in the 
context of a changing competitive environment 
The increasingly competitive domestic and global environment which TSA encountered led to the company 
having to make considerable operational adjustments.  In this environment, the productivity and cost 
competitiveness of both TSA and its suppliers was, and continues to be, severely tested.  Today the 
company competes domestically with local products from a number of other OEMs and imported vehicles 
from a wider range of OEMs located elsewhere in the world.  Internationally the TSA plant has needed to 
continuously prove that its distance from major world markets would not undermine its cost and quality 
competitiveness vis-à-vis other car manufacturers competing in the very tough European markets to which 
TSA’s exports are directed.  The TSA plant in Durban must be competitive not only against other Toyota 
plants in a geographically expanding Europe, but also with the plants of other OEMs in Europe and 
worldwide.  Part of Toyota’s global strategy has been to increase its share of the European market and the 
restructuring of the South African plant has given the company the added production capacity in two of its 
key models to do so.  This combination of the opportunity afforded to Toyota by the South African plant in 
relation to the European market and the related need to have production flexibility in responding to market 
shifts in Europe has been important in securing the company’s ongoing interest in its local production facility. 
Under these circumstances the restructuring process at TSA was largely designed to match the advantages 
of South Africa’s industrial policy and trade systems with the European market opportunity.  In meeting the 
requirements of the MIDP in its restructuring there was a requirement to increase local value-added.  The 
plant shifted from producing seven different models, at relatively low volumes, to essentially two platforms at 
high volumes. In doing so it managed, in some areas of the supply chain, to secure greater local sourcing 
through raising the volume of targeted component orders.  Furthermore, Toyota’s International 
Manufacturing Vehicle (IMV) programme has also sought to create more substantial manufacturing platforms 
in key global supply plants so as to spread risk but also to enable scaled up production of regionally modified 
models off a common chassis platform.  In line with this strategy, TSA also sought to draw in some South 
African suppliers into its global supply networks. 
                                                                  
9 Barnes and Morris (2004) argue that the design of the MIDP favoured German-owned OEMs and their suppliers as opposed to Japanese and American firms.  In the case of 
German OEMs such as Volkswagen and BMW,  for example, local operations were already 100% subsidiaries of their German parent companies and no license restrictions were 
imposed on exporting. On the contrary, TSA was operating under license and its focus was almost exclusively on the domestic market. This not only delayed its integration in the 
MIDP system, but also determined the need to change its global strategy. 
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It is worth briefly illustrating, with some data, the changes in Toyota’s supplier base that have taken place in 
the past few years.  In 1990s, TSA produced 80,000 units over seven models (or platforms) for the South 
African market.  The plant had 154 suppliers.  By 2009, the plant will have raised production to over 200,000 
(mainly Corolla and Hilux models) of which 65% will be for export to Europe.  The firm will have 78 suppliers, 
82 % of which will be what TSA refers to as global sourcing partners in that they are linked into global supply 
arrangements for the models produced in other regions, especially Europe.  In 2003, only 28% of suppliers 
to TSA were characterised by the firm as global sourcing partners.  Between 2003 and 2006, the proportion 
of supply into TSA from suppliers not party to global sourcing arrangements dropped from 41% of total 
sourcing to 18%. Between 2002 and 2006, Toyota’s global sourcing strategy saw the costs for the production 
of the Corolla reduced by 32%.  Whilst the number of suppliers has been gradually reduced, the value of 
supplies in the local market has been gradually increasing as order volumes increase. For example, in 2006, 
70% of the Hilux was sourced locally up from 60% five years ago.   
The changes outlined above brought with them massive pressure on many KwaZulu-Natal-based component 
firms – and in particular on those that were not first-tier global quality operations.  In order to continue 
supplying OEM plants manufacturing for export, these firms had to rapidly adjust to increasing quality 
requirements arising from the motor industries’ rigorous certification procedures, increased scale of 
production and production flexibility.  Whilst those that had been, or became, part of international operations 
could draw on a measure of global expertise, many firms in the second and third tier supply categories 
needed to demonstrate a rapid turn-around in capability without support from international group operations.   
The local content requirements of the MIDP did create some breathing space as Toyota and other OEMs 
had little choice but to work in partnership with local suppliers to upgrade their capabilities.  Toyota also 
made the case that this approach was not only one of obligation, but also formed a key element of good-
practice in running a large, internationally competitive export business.  However, the reality was that, with a 
considerable reduction in models produced domestically, some firms that had survived off small lot 
production, either had to diversify out of automotive components supplies, or had to meet the escalating 
requirements of new manufacturing regimes. 
The Durban region in KwaZulu-Natal Province has hosted auto-related manufacturing businesses for over 50 
years. However, the survival of the sector was by no means guaranteed in a climate of rapidly escalating 
global competition and lowering domestic protection.  It was out of a collective recognition of the importance 
of collaboration amongst local industry stakeholders and a strategic commitment by Toyota to seek 
enhanced supplier capacity that the KZN Automotive Benchmarking Club and ultimately the Durban Auto 
Cluster (or DAC, as it is commonly known) were formed.  The following section explains the formation of 
these initiatives and the nature of activities and impacts. 
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3.4 The KZN Benchmarking Club and the Durban Automotive Cluster 
(DAC)   
During the mid- to late 1990s, the Industrial Restructuring Project (IRP) at the then University of Natal in 
Durban (now the University of KwaZulu-Natal) initiated a series of co-operative pilot competitiveness 
benchmarking activities with a number of local automotive components producers as part of an action-
research endeavour to support firms in critical local sectors respond to competitive pressures.10  These 
activities, and the subsequent development of a co-operative working relationship between the researchers 
and the firms, led ultimately to a decision in the year 2000 to form the Durban Auto Cluster with an initial 
provincial-wide membership of thirty automotive-related manufacturing firms.  The matter of TNC-SME 
linkages was, and continues to be, intrinsic to the work of the DAC. 
The DAC’s predecessor entity, the KZN Benchmarking Club, was formed during 1998 as a firm-driven co-
operative venture, supported in part by government grants, to help firms to consistently evaluate their relative 
performance in terms of both meeting customer demands and against competitor manufacturing process 
activities and to then share ideas on how to use such information to upgrade their performance.  The former 
university-based facilitators subsequently created a special-purpose company to carry out the facilitation 
activities and perform independent (domestic and international) benchmarks.11 
During 1999, the KZN Benchmarking Club was approached by the Economic Development Unit of the then 
Durban Metropolitan Council (now the eThekwini Municipality) to broaden its membership and extend the 
nature of its activities beyond benchmarking-related processes.  During the course of 2000, investigations 
and discussions yielded a strong commitment by almost 30 firms to work together in the form of the Durban 
Auto Cluster with a broader membership and focus than the Benchmarking Club.  Initial funding was secured 
from local government in Durban and supplemented by some funds from the DTI and the KZN Provincial 
Government. 
At its outset, the DAC was to be driven by a firm based governance structure in that firms would make up the 
majority on the decision making structure and lead the working groups driving various projects.  Early 
members included Toyota and a few other smaller OEMs and a range of first, second and third tier firms.  
Firms were encouraged to join regardless of their ownership structure. 
The initial DAC business plan identified four working groups: 
■ The KZN Benchmarking Club would continue to operate as the first working group, open to firms willing to 
participate in regular and comprehensive benchmarking; 
                                                                  
10 This research team, led by Professor Mike Morris, drew inspiration and direct support from the experiences of Professor Raphael Kaplinsky of the Institute of Development Studies 
at Sussex University and John Bessant of the University of Brighton. 
11 This company, now called B&M Analysts, runs benchmarking activities with auto firms in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng (www.bmanalysts.com). 
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■ A second working group focusing on logistics matters would seek to develop a common approach and work to 
reduce costs and bottlenecks; 
■ Human resource issues would be handled by a third working group with an emphasis on matters such as 
improving literacy and numeracy as well as dealing with matters relating to HIV and AIDS in the workplace; and 
■ The fourth working group would tackle matters of supplier development by working towards the adoption of 
common frameworks and accreditation and support systems. 
Participants in the DAC could choose their level of involvement. Some firms chose to participate purely in 
information sharing activities. However, if firms had wanted to access programmes such as training sessions 
or collective logistics negotiations they would have had to upgrade their membership. In a relatively short 
time membership grew beyond 30 firms and the bulk of members were committed to higher levels of 
involvement.  The main objective of the firms participating in the DAC was to get access to information in 
order to enhance their decisions in the workplace (Lorentzen et al, 2004). Firms also indicated that informal 
networking beyond the formal processes of interaction at the DAC provided useful benefits to them. 
3.5 Creating TNC-SME linkages in the DAC 
Within the DAC working groups, it has been the Supplier Development Working Group and the 
benchmarking programmes that have had the most significant impact on relationships between the TNCs 
(inside and outside the DAC) and SMEs making up the majority of the DAC membership.  The activities of 
the Supplier Development Working Group have ranged from sharing knowledge on complex certification and 
standardisation requirements to training purchasing managers and building a network of support from those 
firms wishing to upgrade their supply capabilities.  In an industry with relatively high barriers to entry and 
increasingly sophisticated accreditation and technology management processes the working group 
programmes have enabled smaller firms to familiarise themselves with the sourcing requirements of first tier 
OEM suppliers and the OEMs themselves.  A Toyota official participating in one of the DAC meetings 
indicated that the confidence of the company in the region had been greatly reinforced by the processes of 
the DAC.   
During the course of 2002, as the DAC moved to securing a greater proportion of its funding from its own 
membership, a decision was taken in conjunction with the local government in Durban and KZN Province 
officials to redirect public sector funds to supporting emerging, largely black-owned, SMEs on the periphery 
of the sector to become accredited suppliers.  The participating firms in the DAC committed themselves to 
working with a number of such emerging SMEs through a variety of support activities.  The KZN 
Manufacturing Advisory Centre, a government funded institution, was also persuaded to work to upgrade 
some of the more generic manufacturing-related capabilities of the SMEs where required.  Through this 
programme and ongoing subsidised participation in the workings of the DAC, a number of SMEs have 
successfully increased their supply commitments to the automotive sector. 
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The impact of the collaborative work between transnational corporations (ZNC) it the auto industry (OEMs 
and components producers) and local firms can be found in Table 3 which shows that South African firms’ 
performance has improved over time against international benchmarks.  The major achievement of the DAC 
and the KZN Benchmarking Club has been that they enabled firms to make the best use of opportunities 
offered under the MIDP framework to upgrade their supply capacity.  It is unlikely that the MIDP alone, 
without the facilitated networking activity described, would have created the sustained impacts on the 
competitiveness of firms.  This finding by Barnes et al (2003) has been reinforced by a survey done by 
Lorentzen et al (2004). 
Table 3: Learning and comparative advantage in the auto components sector: 1998-2001 
South African firms Comparator firms 
CSF KPI 







Total inventory (Days) 32 62.6 54.3 47.6 42.0 32.8 31.2 38.6 
Raw material  (Days) 32 32.3 27.9 25.2 21.8 32.7 17.2 19.2 
Work in progress (Days) 32 12.4 8.9 8.1 8.2 34.3 5.3 8.6 
Cost control 
Finished Goods (Days) 32 17.8 17.5 14.3 12.1 32.0 8.6 9.5 
Customer return rate (PPM) 23 3270 2638 1406 1240 62.0 549 624 
Internal reject rate (%) 25  4.9 4.2 3.9 20.7 1.9 3.5 
Quality 
Supplier return rate (PPM) 21  21989 14637 18518 16.0 8319 13213 
Lead time (Days) 17  19.9 19.1 17.9 9.9 16.8 12.0 
Supplier on time & in full delivery 
(%) 
23  78.7 82.1 82.2 4.5 92.2 92.3 
Flexibility 
On time & in full delivery to 
customers (%) 
25  92.2 92.8 92.7 0.6 96.1 93.5 
Training spend as % total 
remuneration 
30  1.3 1.7 2.0 56.2 1.3 3.1 
Capacity to 
change 
Absenteeism (%) 27 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.0 9.4 4.2 5.7 
Innovation 
capacity 
R&D expenditure (%) 
24 1.64 1.70 1.67 2.12 29.5 1.83 2.90 
Source: Barnes J, Kaplinksy R and Morris (2003: 11); KwaZulu-Natal/Eastern Cape and Gauteng Benchmarking Club database 
The impact of the DAC processes and the general policy environment has also been a positive one in terms 
of employment and investment by the firms.  The Figure below provides an indication of the degree to which 
employment levels amongst the DAC firms picked up during the period 2000-2003. 
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Figure 4: Employment trends in DAC members compared to other regions: 2000-2003 
 
Source: Barnes and Johnson (2004: 20) 
In conclusion, it should be noted that the environment in which this linkage activity has been made possible 
has been considerably influenced by national government’s programmes to encourage small business 
development and in particular greater participation by black entrepreneurs in key sectors of the economy.  
This has, for instance, resulted in some of the major OEMs requiring their supplier development divisions to 
make particular efforts to increase procurement from SMEs.  This pressure for change has impacted on the 
supply chain and has also encouraged components suppliers to examine opportunities to spin-off or 
outsource various supply activities to existing SMEs or to support the creation of new ones.  The DAC has 
provided a very effective, accessible and consistent form of support for such processes.  Both domestic and 
foreign-owned firms have been able to make use of its processes and found ways of developing 
relationships and learning than might otherwise have been difficult without the so-called “spill-over” effects of 
knowledge sharing in the DAC. 
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4.  The experience of Mozambique in the 
aluminium sector: creating linkages with 
Mozal through the Investment Promotion 
Centre  
Mozambique’s remarkable recovery from a bitter civil war coupled with one of the world’s highest growth 
rates over the last decade makes the country a notable success story. The country’s political stability since 
1992 has created a business environment that is conducive to investment. As a result, Mozambique has 
become a recipient of some of the highest levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. The 
Government of Mozambique has embraced the opportunities provided by this investment, and has adopted a 
development strategy that is premised on liberal trade and monetary policies, which has enhanced the 
growth of the private sector, strong FDI and sustained GDP growth. The country’s poverty reduction strategy 
(PARP) reflects the importance of strong economic growth to the reduction of poverty in line with the 
millennium development goals (MDGs). 
4.1 Mozambique’s economic environment and its approach to FDI 
and SME development 
Since the end of the civil war in 1992, steady economic growth, driven predominantly by construction and 
manufacturing, has culminated in an average GDP growth rate of about 8% between 1994 and 2004 (IMF, 
2006). GDP grew from an estimated $6.8 billion to $7.6bn between 2005 and 2006 (World Bank, 2007). 
Growth has been fuelled largely by services, FDI in large mega projects and by large flows of international 
aid (Castel-Branco, 2004, OECD, 2005, UNDP, 2006). Since the inception of these mega FDI projects, GDP 
growth has exceeded 10% between 1997 and 1998 and again in 2001 (UNDP, 2006). 
The incidence of poverty has declined markedly since the end of the war. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) suggests poverty had been reduced from 69% of the population in 1996 to 54% in 2003 (IMF, 2006). 
Poverty is distributed unevenly throughout the country, however, with the Northern provinces experiencing 
the highest rates and Maputo province recording the lowest headcount prevalence at 28.2% in 2003 (UNDP, 
2006). An overall improvement in most development indicators, however, has meant that Mozambique’s 
human development index rose from .366 in 2000 to .428 in 2004 (UNDP, 2006). The most recent data 
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shows a decline in HDI to .384 – leaving Mozambique ranked 172nd out of 177 countries with an HDI 
ranking.12 
Since the end of the war, the Government of Mozambique (GoM) has implemented a series of policy 
reforms. The main policy thrusts of the immediate post-war period were the privatisation of State run 
enterprises, increased fiscal austerity and a general opening of the economy through the removal of controls 
on trade and capital (UNCTAD, 2001; Nasir et al  2003; UNDP, 2006). The government also made strong 
moves to decentralisation with the demarcation of 33 districts with their own representation (van Empel, 
2006). The principal components of the GoM’s medium term macroeconomic policy framework were to 
improve private investment and continuing economic growth with a view to addressing economic stability and 
poverty reduction (UNCTAD, 2001; IMF, 2006). Under the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PARPA), export promotion through ‘liberal trade and investment policies’ was taken as the main approach to 
encourage ‘broad based’ economic growth (van Empel, 2006: 4). Mozambique, as member of the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), has adjusted its tariff rates in line with its SADC commitments 
(OECD 2005). However, the prospects of these planned tariff reductions are not particularly clear. The GoM 
also lowered the maximum tariff rate from 25% to 20% to all trading partners as of January 2006 (IMF, 
2006). As for its exports,  Mozambique enjoys tariff breaks for designated exports to the United States under 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) as well as preferential trade status in the European Union 
accorded through the Cotonu Agreement and the Everything-but Arms Initiative13 (Goldin, 2004).  
In line with an increase in international efforts to attract FDI, Mozambique has assembled a package of 
incentives to lure investors (UNCTAD, 2007). Policy steps towards improving the overall business climate in 
Mozambique have included: improving infrastructure, strengthening of property rights, enhancement of 
governance and various labour market reforms (IMF, 2006). Industrial Free Zones (IFZs) were introduced 
following the implementation of the 1993 Investment Law (UNCTAD, 2001; Pretorius 2005). This legislation 
stipulates that investments made within the IFZs have to contribute to the social and economic development 
of the country and have to be managed ‘in line with national economic policy’ (UNCTAD, 2001). The IFZ 
legislation, for example, contains employment clauses to ensure the employment of local labour and to 
regulate the use of expatriate workers (Pretorius, 2005). There are, however, no local content clauses in any 
of the investment or industrial policies currently in place.  
The creation of an investment friendly environment was achieved with extensive cooperation from both the 
private investors themselves and international institutions such as the IMF and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) (Pretorius, 2005). With respect to mega-projects, the Government of Mozambique 
encourages investments through the provision of free industrial zone status, reduced corporate tax 
obligations, various tax deductions linked to infrastructure development and tariff exemptions (IMF, 2006). In 
                                                                  
12 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
13 Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005: Applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. 
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line with the objective of improving the overall business climate, the government’s Investment Promotion 
Centre (CPI) has changed its position as a regulatory body and is now tasked with facilitating investment in 
the economy and promoting linkages with local firms (UNCTAD, 2001). 
Mozambique has become one of the top recipients of FDI among least developed countries and has, in 
recent years, been in the top 20 FDI recipients in Africa (Pretorius, 2005). The amount of FDI increased 
steadily in the years immediately following the civil war and rose from an average inflow of US$21m per 
annum before 1995 to US$153m in the period between 1995 and 2000 (UNIDO, 2002). Between 2004 and 
2006, FDI inflows fluctuated significantly (likely the result of mega project investments), but in 2006 FDI 
inflows of US$154m were in line with the ten year average (UNCTAD, 2007). Since the end of the war, FDI 
stock has also increased markedly from US$882m in 1990 to US$4.7bn in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007). Between 
2000 and 2006, FDI as a share of GDP has increased from 50.5% to 65.4% (UNCTAD, 2007). The ratio of 
FDI to total investment is high, with FDI accounting for 36% of all investment between 1990 and 2003 
(Castel-Branco, 2004). The picture changes significantly, however, when the contribution of mega projects is 
not included (Castel-Branco, 2004). 
Mozambique employs a strategy of promoting SMEs in order to promote poverty alleviation and job creation. 
The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISD) and the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), in both of which Mozambique is a member, endorse the promotion of SMEs to 
create dynamic forward and backward linkages between sectors and to serve as the ‘engine of economic 
growth’ (Thomas 2005). Together with the stimulation of the private sector, government introduced the 2003 
science and technology policy with the objective of “developing the innovate capacity of the national 
productive sector” (UNDP, 2006: 37).  
On the whole, private sector growth and investment have been growing significantly since 2000. The largest 
100 firms in Mozambique reported 34% year-on-year revenue growth (Goldin, 2004). Mozal is ranked as the 
largest industrial firm in Mozambique, while Cervejas de Mocambique (CDM) and Coca-Cola are the largest 
in the food and beverage sector (Goldin, 2004). The agricultural sector has also benefited from FDI. Due to 
investments in sugar and tobacco, the sector grew by over 7% in both 2004 and 2005 (OECD, 2005).  
4.2 ‘Mega projects’ and their impact on Mozambique’s economy   
The current developmental impact of mega projects, which takes up a large share in FDI inflows to 
Mozambique, is mostly derived from increased investor confidence (IMF, 2006). In the case of Mozal, 
extensive investment in the upgrading of infrastructure such as ‘harbour facilities, roads, 
telecommunications, electricity and water supply’ has also been significant (Thomas 2005: 7). The main 
limitation on the developmental impact of mega projects in Mozambique, however, include: “imported inputs, 
debt service, profit transfers, dividends, and royalty repatriation, as well as workers’ remittances, which are 
predominantly transacted off-shore” (IMF, 2006: 10). FDI is also spatially lopsided with over 75% 
concentrated in the Maputo province and very little penetration into other parts of the country (Pretorius, 
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2005). Moreover, the current flows of FDI into Mozambique concentrated in mega projects are largely capital 
intensive and, thus, do not have a significant impact on employment (UNDP, 2006). Employment figures for 
all TNC investments in Mozambique were roughly 13,200 in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2007). Although some analysts 
have pointed towards the employment benefits derived from Mozal, critics (see Castel-Branco, 2005) have 
suggested that these employment statistics do not justify the government’s mega-project attraction strategy.  
Mega projects currently account for approximately 60-70% of total exports from Mozambique (IMF, 2006). 
The Mozal aluminium plant outside of Maputo is the largest mega project in the country and accounts for 
75% of mega project contributions towards GDP, tax revenues and balance of payments (IMF, 2006). Other 
significant mega projects include the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam, the Moma Titanium Minerals Project 
and the Sasol gas pipeline running between South Africa and Mozambique (IMF 2006).  
The Mozal plant was launched in 1998 at a cost of around $2.2bn (Thomas, 2005). The project has since 
been expanded in 2001/02 (Mozal II) and both the original construction and the expansion were completed 
ahead of schedule and well under budget (Thomas, 2005; CPI Interview 14 December 2007). When the first 
phase was completed in 2000, it doubled Mozambique’s exports and brought $400m worth of foreign 
exchange (UNIDO, 2002). Partners and sponsors in the project are a mixture of public and private sector 
stakeholders that include:  
■ BHP Billiton (Australia),  
■ Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) (South Africa)  
■ Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan) 
■ Government of Mozambique  
■ Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (Thomas, 2005) 
The 660 hectare Beluluane Industrial Park, officially opened in 2005, has been established as an Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ) directly adjacent to the Mozal facility in order to attract linkages with the plant 
(UNCTAD, 2001, Thomas, 2005). The park fits within SADC’s spatial development initiative (SDI) model 
which is designed to attract ‘industrial clustering’ around large export projects (Thomas, 2005). Mozal has 
been granted IFZ status by the Government of Mozambique which allows it to import inputs duty free, is 
exempt from VAT and pays no more than 1% of total sales as corporate tax (Castel-Branco, 2004).  
4.3 The Mozal Linkage Programme – creating linkages between TNCs 
and local SMEs 
The idea of creating or improving linkages between TNCs and local SMEs was conceived by government 
between 1997 and 1998 with a view to ensuring greater benefits from FDI. The investment attraction strategy 
 T N C  F D I  F I R M S  A N D  D O M E S T I C  S M E  L I N K A G E S :  R E F L E C T I N G  O N  T H R E E  S A D C  C A S E  S T U D I E S   
  23  
for 1997-2000 created the policy platform for TNC-SME linkage programme. A private consulting firm 
informed the design of the original linkage programme implemented by government. Support from the World 
Bank was also influential (CPI Interview 14 December 2007).  
In the early conceptualisation of a formal SME linkages programme, Mozal represented a good test case for 
implementing the linkage strategy. The simple objective of this initial linkage strategy was to help local firms 
engage with Mozal as much as possible. The Mozal linkages project was initiated in the context of poor SME 
performance in Mozambique. Poor SME performance is explained largely by three factors:  local firms were 
not competitive, smaller firms have very poor access to credit, and a relatively small market size in 
Mozambique. Goldin (2004) describes the origins of the Mozal linkages programme as follows:  
 “In response to Mozal’s planned expansion (and limited use of domestic firms during the first 
phase of construction) in 1998, the CPI conducted an evaluation of 370 national firms, 
uncovering a weak network of supporting businesses. It renewed its linkage efforts, creating a 
more developed database of potential product and service providers (900), and worked with 
Mozal, the Africa Project Development Facility (APDF) and the World Bank to better prepare 
local companies and incorporate them into its procurement” (Goldin, 2004: 7) 
The objective of this initial linkage strategy was to help local firms engage with Mozal as much as possible. 
The main components of the strategy included: database of local firms and their services (supply side); 
technical auditing of the SMEs in the database; identification of firm potential and existing gaps; identification 
of potential markets (demand side); and introduction of local firms to Mozal (CPI Interview 14 December 
2007). 
Box 1 Evolution of the Mozal Linkages Programme 
1997: Linkages form a key component of the government’s Investment Attraction Strategy for 1997-2000 
1998: Mozal I is constructed as the original smelter (built ahead of schedule and under budget) 
1998: CPI undertakes an audit of local firms in anticipation of the construction of the Mozal plant 
2001: Mozal II is an expansion of the original plant and is also constructed ahead of schedule and under budget 
2001: SMEELP is initiated for a two year period to assist local firms to win contracts for the expansion of the Mozal plant 
2003: Mozlink I is introduced by Mozal to build on the successes of SMEELP 
2007: Mozlink II is an extension of Mozlink I and is planned to continue until the end of 2008  
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4.4 The Mozal Linkages Programme’s objectives, structure and 
activities 
The primary objective of the Mozal linkages programme was to increase the level of local SME participation 
in large investment projects in Mozambique. At the outset, it was difficult to select specific outcomes or 
targets for the Mozal linkages programme. It was not clear what type of progress or outcomes could be 
expected given generally weak supply capacity of Mozambican SMEs. Thus, the only indicator used to 
gauge the success of the programme was the number of firms that would become capable of supplying to 
Mozal (CPI Interview 14 December 2007). 
From the Mozal respondent’s perspective, quantitative indicators did not tell the full story of Mozal’s impact 
on local firms and communities. Some of the indicators that are monitored, however, include: number of 
training programmes implemented, amount spent on contracts with local firms and amounts spent on local 
contracts. These indicators point towards the successful implementation of the linkages programme, 
although all of the stakeholders approached during the field visit emphasised that there is still substantial 
scope to improve the number of firms involved in the linkages programme and that creating successful 
linkages with local firms and large investment projects in Mozambique is an ongoing process (CPI Interview 
14 December 2007; Mozal Interview 14 December 2007).  
The Mozal linkages project has been implemented in two distinct phases: the construction phase of Mozal II 
(SME Empowerment Linkages Programme-SMEELP) and the operational phases (Mozlink I and II). During 
the construction phase in 2001/02, the CPI and the IFC (through its African Project Development Facility 
(APDF)) initiated the programme with support from Mozal and 15 local SMEs participated (Pretorius, 2005; 
Thomas, 2005; IFC Interview 13 December 2007). Selection of SMEs into the programme was done by 
Mozal and the CPI. SMEELP was originally scheduled for a 24 month period after which the programme was 
handed over to the CPI to manage (Pretorius, 2005). SMEELP consisted of a number of important 
components (Thomas, 2005; IFC Interview 13 December 2007): 
■ The redesign (unbundling) of larger contracts into smaller ones by Mozal and the CPI; 
■ A target of 25 local SMEs was originally selected; 
■ The goal was for 3-4 local firms to bid for each contract; 
■ Local SMEs participated in a training programme prior to bidding for a contract; 
■ The training programme included: 
• Training on how to work with large TNCs; 
• Training on how to successfully bid for contracts; 
• How to deliver and manage contracts; and 
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• Marketing skills 
In June 2003, the implementation of a new linkages programme (Mozlink I) was announced by Mozal (with 
support from the CPI and the IFC) and was driven by a need to create real and ongoing linkages with the 
Mozambican economy. The motivations for Mozal were largely the Public Relations benefits of engaging with 
the local economy and the potential for increased flexibility in terms of delivery times and sustainability 
gained from contracting locally (IFC Interview 13 December 2007). The programme was to run for another 12 
months and was based on the successes of SMEELP (Pretorius, 2005; Thomas, 2005).  
Mozlink I was designed as a replication of SMEELP but also had several important differences. First, there 
were other players apart from Mozal involved and these included: Sasol, CDM, EDM and Coca-Cola. These 
stakeholders formed the steering committee for the project and provided additional markets for SMEs, 
mentorship, technical assessment and training. For Mozlink II (the current linkages programme and an 
extension of Mozlink I) all of these players made a financial contribution to the programme. Professional 
consultants were hired for the technical training and assessments (IFC Interview 13 December 2007; CPI 
Interview 14 December 2007).  
Outside of these main linkage programmes (SMEELP and Mozlink I & II), several stakeholders have initiated 
programmes to support linkages between local SMEs and MNCs. The Project for Enterprise Development 
(PODE), with financing from the World Bank, for example, was designed to facilitate linkages between local 
firms and large investments in sectors such as ‘construction, graphics, electrics and metal/mechanics’ 
(Goldin, 2004). Similarly, the IFC through its Private Enterprise Partnerships Programme (PEP) has initiated 
an SME competitiveness programme which focuses on large industrial projects in the minerals and energy 
sectors in Mozambique (Thomas, 2005). The objectives of the programme are similar to those of SMEELP 
and Mozlink and the investors include: Mozal, Sasol, Maputo Port and Chibuto Corridor Sands (Thomas, 
2005).   
Mozal itself created the Mozal Community Development Trust (MCDT) to promote the social development of 
the communities surrounding Mozal (Thomas, 2005; Mozal Interview 14 December 2007). The project has a 
budget of $2 million per annum and has a particular focus on training and educational initiatives that create 
an enabling environment for small businesses (Thomas, 2005). In 2004, the IFC offered support to the 
MCDT in the form of financing for a school in the community that promotes the types of skills that could result 
in employment or a contract with Mozal (Thomas, 2005).  
Finally, Mozambican SMEs themselves have been stakeholders in one of the most important components of 
the linkages programme. The IFC facilitated the creation of the Mozambique Business Network which is a 
network of 15 local SMEs that offer a forum for sharing ideas and experiences pertaining to contracts with 
large TNCs in Mozambique (Thomas, 2005; IFC Interview 13 December 2007). The membership of the 
network was originally formed from participants in SMEELP and Mozlink I and it now holds monthly meetings 
to connect firms, banks, corporations and other relevant stakeholders (Thomas, 2005; IFC Interview 13 
December 2007).   
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4.5 The impact of the Mozal Linkages Programme 
The impacts of these linkages programmes have been acknowledged by a range of stakeholders and 
researchers. Thomas (2005) observes that the case of Mozal is unique in that strong examples of both 
success and failure provide lessons for linkages in other SADC countries. Pretorius (2005) and Goldin (2004) 
note that one of the most significant impacts of the programmes reported by participant firms has been the 
experience gained in supplying to a large international firm with strict quality and delivery standards. 
Similarly, Goldin (2004) argues that SMEs themselves support the presence of large firms. In a survey of 
SMEs, 80% indicated that the existence of large firms in the Maputo area was important to their own 
operations (Goldin, 2004). The majority of these SMEs did not begin their operations as a direct result of 
Mozal, but an overwhelming majority (nearly 90%) had an expectation of winning a Mozal contract at some 
stage. In terms of revenues, those firms in the survey that reported having a contract with a large firm 
indicated that those contracts contributed an average of 55% to total revenues (Goldin, 2004).  
In terms of the number of successful contracts derived from the linkage programme, 27 Mozal contracts 
worth over US$5m were awarded to local firms within the SMEELP programme that took place between 
2001 and 2003 (Thoma,s 2005; CPI Interview 14 December 2007). Under SMEELP, 36 SMEs completed the 
training programme and the direct costs of SMEELP came to only US$500,000 even though Billiton had 
originally budgeted US$1m. According to the firms surveyed by Goldin (2004), 88% described the SMEELP 
programme as helpful or useful. Roughly 10% of these firms considered the occasion to meet with other 
firms and hear about upcoming business opportunities as the most important aspect of SMEELP (Goldin, 
2004).  
In 2005, the first phase of Mozlink-the successor to SMEELP- had generated US$11m worth of contracts to 
local SMEs (Thomas, 2005). Between 2002 and 2007, Mozal increased its monthly spending with local firms 
from US$5m to US$17m per month (IFC 2007). Over this same period, Mozal increased the number of firms 
from which they source locally from 40 to 250 (IFC 2007). In describing the success of the programme in 
building local capacity, Thomas (2005) notes that one firm involved in Mozlink was recently awarded a US$2 
million contract with one of the aluminium smelters in Richard’s Bay, South Africa. Mozal is satisfied with the 
extension of Mozlink and is actively involved with the extension of the linkage programme. It has been 
particularly influential in communicating to other large firms the importance of the linkages model. There are 
currently 25 SMEs in the Mozlink programme and the target number for the extension of the project is 100 
firms (IFC Interview 13 December 2007). By 2005, 18 SMEs had already undergone the diagnostics process, 
17 firms had been assisted with tender training and 12 firms were in the mentoring stage of the programme 
(Thomas, 2005).  
The success of the linkages programme as a whole was primarily measured, from the perspective of the IFC, 
on the additional revenues accrued by the participating SMEs. This was an indicator that was originally 
included in the IFCs project proposal. One problem with the indicator, however, was that firms outside of the 
programme which had also benefited from the programme were not adequately captured. There is some 
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information on additional revenue accrued to participating SMEs, which suggested that the programme has 
been a success. Some of the SMEs have won contracts worth around US$400-600m.  
A number of participating SMEs are also growing at a phenomenal rate. One major success of the 
programme has been the formation of several networking forums. The first is the Mozambique Business 
Network which is a forum for SMEs, banks and various other stakeholders to exchange ideas and talk about 
successes, failures and lessons. The second is a participatory process associated with the business 
diagnostics exercises that accompany the programme. SMEs participating in the linkage programme are 
required to give presentations to the diagnostics team on a regular basis. There is also a scoring system 
which has revealed that a number of SMEs are improving the quality of their services in line with international 
standards. Workshops are also conducted so that the findings of the diagnostics assessments can be 
communicated back to the SMEs. According to IFC, local SME performance has improved by roughly 20 % 
through the Mozlink programme (IFC Interview 13 December 2007). 
Perhaps one of the impacts more difficult to measure is potentially numerous ‘spin offs’ that come from 
supply chains in which Mozal are connected. In an SME survey, for example, 79% of firms answered that a 
contract with a large firm had caused them to increase inputs. Moreover, the firms reported that the 
‘reputation effect’ of having a contract with Mozal allowed them to gain easier access to other corporate 
contracts (Goldin, 2004). The Mozal respondent, in an interview conducted in December 2007, emphasised 
that the impacts from the linkages programme extended far beyond the SMEs that participated in the formal 
programme.  
Also important for SMEs, according to Mozal, was that the need to meet stringent quality and processing 
requirements helped them to update their services in line with internationally accepted standards. This is 
particularly relevant to health and safety standards and for each firm’s HIV/AIDS policy (VCT and education). 
As a result of newly imposed standards, some of the local firms have now applied for ISO9000 status, and 
some SMEs are also expanding to service projects other than Mozal, i.e. diversifying their production (ICC 
Interview 14 December 2007).  
Mozal has also had an impact on employment both at the plant itself and through firms engaged in the 
supply chain. The official employment statistics for Mozal are understood to be: 
■ Mozal I: 745 full time jobs and 2,500 indirect jobs through linkages; 
■ Mozal II: another 376 full time jobs (2001-present); 
■ 9,000 construction jobs; 
■ 5,000 workers trained during construction phase; 
■ Mozal II resulted in over 6,000 temporary jobs during the expansion phase (Thomas 2005: 8). 
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Each of these employment categories feature predominantly Mozambican employees – ranging from 65%-
90% (Thomas, 2005). Other employment impacts from Mozal come from SMEs with contracts. According to 
Goldin’s (2004) firm survey, between 50%-73% of the small firms canvassed reported that they hired more 
employees as a result of either increased business derived from a contract with a large firm or to meet the 
demands of the contract itself. Mozal currently has an estimated 400 employed people on site to deliver a 
number of service contracts valued at roughly US$35 million per annum (Thomas 2005). Between 2002 and 
2003, US$80m was awarded in contracts to 130 local firms (Goldin, 2004). Mozal also benefits from these 
linkages and, as the Mozal respondent stated, ‘Mozal’s efficiency and profitability is due to positive and 
effective linkages with local firms. A part of that success is the people’.  Overall, both Mozal and GoM 
respondents indicated that they felt the programme was achieving its goals (CPI Interview 14 December 
2007; Mozal Interview 14 December 2007). 
4.6 Challenges associated with the Mozal Linkages Programme 
An initial challenge associated with the Mozal I project was that the Mozal contracts were large and 
contained a range of different components that local SMEs found difficult to address (Thomas, 2005; IFC 
Interview 13 December 2007).  The main beneficiaries of the Mozal project in terms of both construction 
(60%) and the supply of technical inputs (60%) have been large South African firms (Pretorius, 2005). One of 
the main reasons for this outcome is that smaller local firms have neither the capacity to supply technical 
services or to make use of aluminium ingots (Pretorius, 2005). Local research has suggested that poor 
standards, quality and delivery are serious constraints for the vast majority of local firms (Pretorius, 2005). 
Also, the contracts were written in English and some of the Mozambican firms could not deliver services in 
English (Thomas, 2005). 
A World Bank and Confederation of Business Associations of Mozambique (CTA) firm survey in 2002 
revealed that the three main constraints that prevented investment in Mozambique had been: a lack of 
access to finance; an uncertain policy and regulatory climate; and poor infrastructure (Nasir et al , 2003; 
Goldin, 2004). The same set of constraints prevailed in the years after the survey. One South African firm 
contracted to Mozal also noted that its own linkages with local firms were limited, due, to a large extent, to a 
general lack of technical capacity and skilled labour (ODM Interview 13 December 2007).  
The general consensus was that Mozambican firms have not reached the technical capacity to manufacture 
aluminium products from the ingots (Goldin, 2004). A consultancy firm contracted to facilitate the diagnostics 
and training of the local firms participating in the linkages programme found that the main challenge to 
improving linkages was the sheer gap between the production technology, scale, and efficiency that was 
required by a mega contractor like Mozal and those that could be offered by local SMEs. In a case where a 
contract was won, some local firms had used almost all its resources to service Mozal; such that the growth 
would not be sustainable without the Mozal contract (ICC Interview 14 December 2007). 
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With respect to the design of the Mozal linkage programme, the main challenge was that the local SMEs 
were in need of more financial and technical support than the programme was offering. In particular, local 
SMEs would need help in accessing credit in order to implement whatever was learned in the programme. 
Management capacity of SMEs should also be further addressed through the training programme (CPI 
Interview 14 December 2007). Many local SMEs, which were family firms, required technical support in 
improving their marketing, diversifying their production, and developing an export strategy. According to the 
IFC interview, “[Local firms] need help with a vision. They keep doing the same things they have been doing 
for years.” All the interview respondents emphasised that each stakeholder should have a role in this, and 
that access to credit, in particular, was a potential area for government intervention.  
The problem of access to credit had been addressed, within the linkages programme, through a capacity 
building programme aimed at two financial institutions (Thomas, 2005). The CPI respondent, during an 
interview, mentioned that efforts have also been made to persuade banks to reconsider the risk profile of 
SMEs with Mozal contracts, though the banks seemed to remain hesitant to approve finance. Banks such as 
ABSA and Barclays have initiated a tentative plan to extend credit to Mozal contract holders, but it has been 
very paper work intensive. When several bank loans did come out of the process, the plan that was sketched 
was not implemented.  
Another challenge is related to a palpable lack of transparency around the government’s procurement 
clauses with respect to contracts with Mozal. Few stakeholders outside the government had a clear 
understanding of the actual process to get local SMEs contracted to Mozal works. There has been a tangible 
feeling among many local SMEs that Mozal contracts mostly went to foreign firms with operations in 
Mozambique (IFC Interview 13 December 2007). A further criticism of the linkages programme is that it has 
only benefited firms in the south: there are firms in the north (mainly agricultural) but logistical problems have 
prevented them from participation in the linkages programme.  
During interviews conducted for this study, some respondents expressed views that FDI in Mozambique, 
often dominated by mega projects like Mozal, could be promoting backward linkages with South African firms 
rather than with Mozambican counterparts. Overall, respondents suggested that there was still significant 
scope for promoting linkages, especially in other sectors and in other parts of the country. As the CPI 
respondent suggested, “Even Mozal can issue more local contracts- all sorts of smaller things could still be 
supplied locally (e.g. office calendars and all kinds of small things)” (CPI Interview 14 December 2007). 
The Mozal respondent agreed with this assessment and added that a key challenge for them was finding the 
right types of local entrepreneurs. During the selection process, it was important for local firms to display they 
were striving to create a successful business rather than just winning a Mozal contract. Another related 
challenge was creating commercially viable businesses with these entrepreneurs. In order to encourage 
more TNCs to form linkages with local SMEs, there was a need to address the concerns of some large firms 
that engaging with local SMEs was not a viable strategy, because of conventionally perceived problems such 
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as lack of production quality and delivering capacity of local SMEs. “There are really no excuses for large 
TNCs not to engage with local suppliers for procurement” (Mozal Interview 14 December 2007).   
As an ongoing process, the Mozal linkages programme has attempted to address some of the key 
challenges to promoting enhanced SME participation with large firms. SMEELP attended to some of the 
challenges experienced during the first construction phase of Mozal and, perhaps most significantly, 
encouraged the ‘unbundling’ of larger contracts into smaller, more manageable packages (Thomas 2005, 
IFC Interview 13 December 2007). The programme also identified services that could be sourced locally and 
provided more extensive training for local SMEs (Thomas, 2005; IFC Interview 13 December 2007; CPI 
Interview 14 December 2007).  
The key to these successes has been constant and productive dialogue between all stakeholders involved in 
the linkages programme. This particular success has prompted a number of analysts and stakeholders to 
point to the Mozal experience as a ‘good practice’ model for SME-TNC linkage promotion in the SADC 
region.  The combination of clear and unambiguous government support for the creation of linkage-
partnerships and the willingness of a trans-national company to commit its own resources to such a process 
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5.  Experience of Lesotho in the textile sector: 
setting up an Inter-Ministerial Textile and 
Apparel Industry Task Force and the issue of 
linkages 
Lesotho is a small landlocked, mountainous country that falls entirely within the geographical territory of 
South Africa (up to 66% of the terrain is mountainous). The population consists of 1.8m people (2006). As of 
2006, Lesotho’s GNI was US$1.1bn with a GDP annual growth rate of 2.8% (World Development Indicators 
database, April 2007).  Given its geography, the limited natural resource base and limited industrial 
experiences, Lesotho has a relatively small domestic economic base and has over the years relied on 
remittances from its citizens employed in South African mines, farms and industries. However, the flow of 
remittances has been on the decline because of mine closures and retrenchments. In response to the 
decline in remittances, Lesotho’s government aimed at developing a sound garment and textile industry in 
light of its employment creation capacity. Today, the clothing manufacturing industry makes up the bulk of 
the country’s workforce and it contributes about 20% of Lesotho’s GDP and close to 70% of exports (IMF, 
2006).   
5.1 The clothing and textile industry in Lesotho 
The clothing manufacturing industry in Lesotho is dominated by affiliates of foreign firms, largely of 
Taiwanese origin.  There are also a few Chinese and South African owned firms. The key input in garment 
production, fabric, is in the main imported from the above mentioned countries or other Asian countries. In 
2004, a US$100m textile mill opened – which makes ring spun yarn (sold in South Africa only) and denim 
fabric (sold in Lesotho and elsewhere in the world). It is important to note that few fabrics are sourced in 
Lesotho because there is only this one fabric supplier. To a limited extent low value material such as 
packaging is sourced locally.  The fact that Lesotho’s manufacturing base is limited to very few firms is a 
constraining factor in local sourcing. 
While there is a considerable body of literature around the Lesotho clothing industry, very little has enquired 
on the nature and extent of relationships between the large foreign firms (that is, Transnational Corporations 
or TNCs) and local enterprises. The government of Lesotho notes that “the garment and clothing industry is 
mostly foreign owned and well connected to the global markets … but has limited linkages to the rest of the 
economy particularly the local private sector comprised of micro and small enterprises engaged in trade, 
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services, construction and sandstone” (Government of Lesotho, 2006). Domestically owned businesses are 
largely detached from the production, supply and service value chains in Lesotho’s clothing industry. 
The clothing industry has been the main source of earnings from manufactured exports between 2000 and 
2005.14 Figure 5 illustrates the composition of recorded exports for the period 2000-2005. Since 2000, 
clothing had been the dominant export earner accounting for 74% of total exports in 2004. Diamonds 
became another major contributor to the country’s export earnings from 2004.  
Figure 5: Composition of recorded exports, 2000-2005 (millions, Maloti)15 
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho (as cited by the IMF, 2006) 
Lesotho is one of the few Sub-Saharan countries that have, since 2000, seen a year-on-year increase in the 
exports of clothing products to the United States. Over the period 1999-2005, garment exports increased 
from US$100m to US$460m, an average annual growth of more than 58% (Commark Trust as cited by the 
MFA, 2005). To a large extent this was made possible by the provisions of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), which gave duty and quota free access to US markets whilst using fabric imported 
from third countries.16 These provisions attracted FDI inflows from Taiwan and China.  Consequently, 93% of 
                                                                  
14 Some respondents argued that such exports would have been greater had the local currency, the Maloti not been pegged to the volatile South African Rand which in 2004 
experienced considerable appreciation against the US dollar hence making Lesotho’s exports relatively expensive. 
15 These figures do not include sales in the South African Customs Union (SACU) which are estimated by Bennett to be at the level of around 15-18% of total non-SACU exports. 
16 On 18 May 2000, AGOA was signed into US law. In principle, the law aims to support LDCs, using trade as a stimulus to investment and employment creation. Under AGOA, 
Lesotho and other LDCs qualify for duty free access to the US. Two of the most important aspects of AGOA are its Rules of Origin and the 3rd Country fabric provision. With 
reference to the former, duty free access to the US is only possible when garments are made of 85% US yarn and fabric or other yarn and fabric from other AGOA compliant 
countries, however limited to a maximum of 3.5 % of all US apparel imports (UNCTAD, 2003b). In addition to the rule of origin, LDCs like Lesotho can also source their fabric from 
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Lesotho’s garments are currently being channelled to the United States market.17  For instance, of the 26m 
pairs of denim jeans that are manufactured in Lesotho, 98% are sold in the United States, and smaller 
volumes in the European Union, Canadian and SACU18 markets (Bennett, 2006). The direction of trade, 
especially that associated with clothing exports is “no accident of nature, geography or industrial advantage” 
but is rather the result of the “tariff and derogation benefits provided under AGOA” (FIAS, 2006a). With 
regard to the sustainability of export growth, Lesotho faces a number of challenges if it is to survive the post-
AGOA period19. Issues of market access, product competitiveness, productivity, investment promotion and 
HIV/AIDS are some of the key challenges (MFA Forum, 2005).  To overcome the challenges, Lesotho needs 
to improve the human resource capabilities. Beyond the clothing industry, Lesotho also sees the efficient 
utilisation of its water resources as the key to continue generating stable export earnings and creating more 
employment opportunities. Through its newly initiated US government Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 
project (administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation or MCC)20, the government of Lesotho 
recognises the significance of improving industrial water supply to secure future textile and other investment.   
5.2 The dynamics of the global garment industry and its impact on 
Lesotho 
The global clothing and textile industry has over the years been subject to a number of changes with respect 
to international trade and global governance.  Foremost amongst these recent changes was the expiry of the 
Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and its successor, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. The MFA came 
to an end on 31 December 2004. The MFA system was essentially a quota system that restricted imports 
into United States and European markets in an effort to protect the domestic industries.21 Whilst the quota 
was applied to all other countries, not all countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa were able to meet 
their production quotas. Consequently, Asian countries that had exhausted their production quotas spread 
production to other regions (Kaplinsky, 2005 in Morris and Sedowski, 2006). 
A conspicuous characteristic of Lesotho’s clothing manufacturing industry is the dominance of foreign-owned 
export-oriented manufacturing plants (Salm et al, 2002). Table 4 reports the number of clothing 
manufacturing firms in Lesotho by country of origin. Taiwan Province of China is the main country of origin 
                                                                  
any other country in the world through the 3rd country provision. Through sourcing globally, Lesotho firms can benefit from the “most competitive fabrics and tap production and 
supply networks in Asia” (FIAS, 2006a). In recent times, fabrics and trims from China and Taiwan have been preferred by influential global buyers. By sourcing fabric from a small 
number of factories, buyers and agents gain economies of scale and quality control.  
17 The EU in early 2008 extended a similar benefit to Lesotho (an some other SADC countries) via the recent Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated as a 
replacement to previous Africa-Carribean-Pacific (ACP) targeted arrangements of the Lome Convention. 
18 Other SACU members, in addition to Lesotho, are Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland. 
19 The Africa Investment Act 2006 (AGOA IV) extends the AGOA textile and apparel provisions programme until 2015, and the third country provision until 2012 (and increases the 
cap to 3.5 % beginning October 1, 2006. 
20 The objectives of the MCA project include: the construction of the Metolong dam for water supply into the industrial sector; improvement in household water supply and sanitation; 
improved health sector infrastructure facilities for the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS; and promotion of private sector development through transforming the investment climate 
(Government of Lesotho, 2003). 
21 It should be noted that both the US and EU introduced so-called safe-guard quotas that are under review on an annual basis. 
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for clothing manufacturing firms operating in Lesotho. There are no Basotho-owned clothing manufacturing 
firms except for small, often informal, enterprises servicing niche local markets such as school uniforms and 
single-order designed outfits. From the interviews, it was found that that the bulk of the export-oriented firms 
are run by production managers of foreign origin and firm activities are therefore coordinated from the 
company headquarters located in either Taiwan Province of China or China. A majority of firms (71% of all 
firms) manufacture knitted garments while 19% of the firms deal with denim jeans/woven garments. The 
Formosa Mill is the sole textile manufacturing plant in Lesotho (see Table 5). 
Table 4: Lesotho clothing manufacturing portfolio (exporting firms): 200522 
Country of origin Number of firms % 
China 2 5.6 
Taiwan 30 83.3 
Singapore 1 2.8 
South Africa 2 5.6 
Mauritius 1 2.8 
Total 36 100.0 
Source: LNDC: Lesotho manufacturing portfolio (July 2005) 
Table 5: Clothing manufacturing firms by sub-sector and number of employees: 2005 
Industry sub-sector Number of firms % Number of employees % 
Denim jeans / woven 8 19 14,754 37 
Knitted garments 30 71 20,889 52 
Denim fabric 1 1 950 2 
Ancillary (embroidery; screen printing) 3 7 171 0 
Estimated temporary workers    3,600 0 
Total 42 100 40,364 100 
Source: Bennett (2006) 
A great proportion of clothing manufactures in Lesotho are TNC Cut-Make-Trim (CMT) firms (Salm et al, 
2002). CMT, by definition, is a system under which a producer, as a subcontractor to a distributor (or another 
manufacturer) produces garments to the latter's precise specifications, while the fabric and designs are 
normally supplied by the distributor (Ndlela and Robinson, 1995). This is in contrast to Free On Board (FOB) 
firms where clothing manufactures must actually purchase the fabric and trims. Under an FOB arrangement, 
ownership of the raw materials for clothing belongs to the producer, not to the distributor. The government of 
Lesotho encourages firms to move away from CMT to FOB through its Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCC) 
– a facility that rewards firms that export. The DCC facility however is a temporary facility, and will expire in 
                                                                  
22 LNDC data refers largely to those foreign-owned firms that the LNDC has had direct dealings with so the actual number of firms is slightly higher as reflected in the table that 
follows. 
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2009. Given the constraints within Lesotho’s textile and clothing industry, the extent to which the DCC facility 
has actually encouraged local sub-contracting is limited. 
Since the advent of Lesotho’s eligibility to the AGOA in 2001, the clothing and textiles industry is the one 
sector that has grown and absorbed a significant part of the labour force (mostly women). It is estimated that 
40 000 or almost half of the total labour force of Lesotho (84,000 in 2005) are in the ready-made garment 
sector (MFA Forum, 2005). As can be seen in Table 5, the bulk of the workers are employed in the knitted 
industry sub-sector (57%) and the denim jeans/woven garments sub sector (40%). Bennett (2006) points out 
that more people are actually employed in the clothing and textile industry than in the civil service. The 
Lesotho clothing and textile industry is therefore an important sector in terms of both export earnings and 
employment creation with an estimate annual wage bill for the sector of M550 million.  
5.3 The role of public sector in supporting the development of 
Lesotho's garment industry 
The principal government forces behind the development of the textile and clothing industry in Lesotho are 
the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC), the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Cooperatives 
and Marketing (which we will refer to as the Ministry of Trade), and to a limited extent, the Basotho 
Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDCO).  The Ministry of Trade and Industry has sought to align its 
business regulatory function with the needs of the textile and clothing sector and has been active in 
supporting initiatives to get the AGOA provisions extended.  The focus of the LNDC has been more on 
negotiating the particular needs of TNC firms with respect to premises and a range of investment incentives.  
While a measure of overlap is evident in the functions of these bodies, the Ministry of Trade is primarily 
responsible for industrial policy development through its FDI and domestic investment directorate. In 
particular, the Ministry would like to see a situation where local enterprises have some form of linkages with 
large business, though officials indicated that there was little indication of this occurring.  According to the 
Ministry of Trade officials interviewed, the ownership structure of Lesotho-based TNCs (which largely 
consists of branch operations of Asian parent companies) as well as the lack of attention to these matters by 
powerful global retailers makes the establishment of any linkages extremely difficult. 
The focus of the LNDC has been on negotiating the particular needs of TNC firms with respect to premises 
and a range of investment incentives.  The LNDC administers the industrial estates and the investment 
process in cooperation with medium and large investors (with capital of at least 500,000Maloti) that want to 
invest in Lesotho. There are two divisions within the domestic investment promotion division of the LNDC – a 
local division and a foreign division.  The local branch primarily focuses on support of domestic investment 
and expansion of existing facilities. Since late 2007, there have been some internal discussions in the LNDC 
on the option of exploring how linkages can be established between big (foreign) textiles and clothing firms 
 T N C  F D I  F I R M S  A N D  D O M E S T I C  S M E  L I N K A G E S :  R E F L E C T I N G  O N  T H R E E  S A D C  C A S E  S T U D I E S   
  36  
and the local private sector through, for example, the promotion of joint ventures.23 However, there is nothing 
concrete that has come from this activity to date. 
The Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation is for the most part responsible for driving the 
“establishment and development of Basotho-owned enterprises” of a micro and medium nature (Mthente, 
2007). As with the LNDC, some plans for forging links with the TNCs are under consideration. However, as 
of yet this has not progressed beyond a research study to explore linkages between Basotho owned 
enterprises and the larger firms.  
5.4 The approach to linkages in the garment sector and the 
experience of the IMTT 
The Inter-Ministerial Task Team (IMTT) was set up in 2004, as a multi-stakeholder grouping, with the 
principal objective to address issues raised by foreign textile and clothing manufacturers operating in 
Lesotho (Government of Lesotho, 2004b). With its secretariat located in the Ministry of Trade, the IMTT 
members include Ministries of Employment and Labour, Finance and Development Planning, Home Affairs 
and Public Safety, Local Government, Natural Resources, Public Works and Transports, the Central Bank of 
Lesotho, the LNDC, utility companies and the private sector (Government of Lesotho, 2004b). The technical 
committee of the IMTT was set to address eight major challenges identified by the stakeholders.  These 
related to: foreign exchange; visa issues; taxation; clearance procedures; AGOA; incentives; security; and 
infrastructure. The IMTT’s initial concern was to enable the sustainable growth of the textile and clothing 
industry, in an environment of considerable uncertainty with regards to the future of the sector.  The retention 
and expansion of garment-related FDI firms was seen to be the priority within this process. Consequently, it 
was revealed in the interviews that creating TNC-SME linkages was not considered as a major issue, and 
was never discussed in any of the IMTT meetings According to two key government informants, the IMTT 
hardly met in 2007 and it was not clear whether it was still operational.  
While the IMTT has lost some of its momentum, since its initial focus on supporting the development of the 
denim mill in 2005 and resolving some of the concerns of investing firms in subsequent activities, it remains 
a structure that has some potential to address issues when needed. The Government of Lesotho, according 
to officials interviewed, is in principle willing to support linkages in the textile and clothing industry and in 
other sectors. However, there was some concern that any process should not add to the obligations of 
investing firms as this might result in them deciding to relocate to an alternative country.  Nevertheless, the 
bulk of the stakeholders, including some of the firms, agreed that there was a need to reinforce linkages 
between TNC and SMEs as well as among SMEs, not only in the textiles and clothing industry but also in 
other sectors like natural resources and government procurement. 
                                                                  
23 The domestic investment promotion division of the LNDC is the process of developing an enterprise development facility. The facility has as part of its components a credit 
guarantee facility, equity facilitation (that is, a possibility of initially sharing the risk and then a buy-out of the LNDC), and an intermediary loan facility earmarked for big institutions that 
can lend out to SMEs and business support consultancy. 
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Despite the general sense articulated by respondents that linkages were desirable, a number also expressed 
concerns over whether such a venture to create linkages could be viable. There was a common sentiment 
that Basotho owned enterprises did not have the capacity to produce for the foreign based affiliates, as they 
lacked the expertise to produce quality products. At the same time, there was no legislative requirement that 
compelled the TNCs to link with local enterprises for purposes of transferring technical know-how or any 
other expertise to local suppliers. Some doubted whether the textile and clothing industry should be 
earmarked for an all out linkages programme at all under circumstances where the dominant large retailers, 
branded manufacturers and marketers had not taken on board such commitments and in turn required them 
of their suppliers.  According to one interviewee, it was after all of these global buyers “who control global 
production networks and stipulate supply specifications” (Mthente, 2007). 
In the past, an effort was made through a DFID-funded project, initiated in 1998, where the government tried 
to establish a Garments Centre which was run by the Lesotho Manufacturers Association (LMA). One of the 
objectives of the garment centre was to improve productivity of Basotho owned enterprises – in part to raise 
their capacity as potential suppliers to exporting firms. However, it was reported by stakeholders that this 
effort did not receive total commitment from all the stakeholders, and therefore did not succeed. Other 
attempts to respond to broader industrial linkages have included the strengthening of the indigenous private 
sector through the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), supported in the Privatisation and 
Private Sector Development Program financed by the World Bank since 1995.   
5.5 The scope for future linkage development in apparel and other 
sectors 
Respondents interviewed for the study were asked whether a structure similar to the IMTT, or the IMTT itself, 
would be able to initiate and sustain a linkages initiative. Generally it was felt that a structure such as the 
IMTT would be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the support of linkages. In this regard most felt 
it was necessary that the support of the entities that local affiliates were contracted to was secured as well as 
the support of major buyers.      
In planning for TNC-SME linkages programme, it was also stated that the Government of Lesotho could look 
beyond its borders and think regionally. The survival of Lesotho’s textile and clothing industry in the post-
2012 period may lie in regional integration and the ability of Lesotho to gain a measure of market-share in 
the SADC region, and particularly in South Africa. A number of South African owned business have actually 
set up in Lesotho with the aim of supplying into the Southern African market in the textile and clothing sector 
as well as in other sectors. South African firms appeared to be more comfortable with exploring the idea of 
local linkages with Basotho firms and with exporting firms. 
Lesotho could therefore look into the potential of a SADC-wide textile and garment sector TNC-SME linkage 
programme. As a small country Lesotho, alone may not offer a big enough basket of supplying enterprises 
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for a meaningful linkage programme, but SADC as whole could present better prospects. Proximity to 
regional buyers, smaller production runs, and a good knowledge on local demand and preferences may 
provide Basotho-owned enterprises with a better scope to develop their business and supply capacity than is 
presently possible under the current orientation towards the United States market.  
Some industry experts suggested that an important first step would be to identify buyers that may want to 
source product from Lesotho or Southern Africa, as well as inventory of production capacity in Lesotho and 
in the region (for example listing embroidery suppliers and providing information as to their production 
capacity, technology and contact details). A regional linkage programme could therefore start with an 
inventory of SMEs, including design houses and sourcing agents, as well as an assessment on 
infrastructure, trade logistics and environmental impact. A regionally driven linkages programme would also 
need to consciously address issues related to costs, lead times, quality, and dissemination of buyer/agent 
related information and clustering. The focus should also be on improving local and regional competitiveness 
so that manufacturers are able to meet the health and safety standards of the clothing brands” (Interview 
with Commark, 2007).  There was also scope to build on nascent linkages with the sector in fields such as 
transport, business services and equipment supply and repair. 
With a view to improving the supply capacity of local SMEs, the Smart Partnership office under the Prime 
Minister’s office, whose function is to encourage greater collaboration between the public and private sector 
for wealth creation and economic growth, could also be encouraged to play a role.  The newly initiated 
Millennium Challenge Account project is one attempt that tries to create an enabling business environment 
for private sector development. The MCA initiative is designed on the basis of the aforementioned 
government documents. Within the MCA project one of the key elements is the support of local 
entrepreneurs through private sector capacity building and investment. 
Initiatives such as that by the Basotho Enterprises Development Corporation (BEDCO) to link local 
entrepreneurs with the foreign owned garment manufacturers could also be considered for possible support. 
The programme, should it be implemented, intends to select the top 10 SMEs that meet the screening 
criteria, such as the availability of at least 60 sewing machines. Selected SMEs would subsequently be 
attached to TNCs. Industry mentors to assist with factory level operations.24 The mentors would develop and 
run a 6-month training programme after which the readiness of respective enterprises will be confirmed and 
attempts to secure contracts made. The long term vision, according to BEDCO staff, is the creation of a SME 
garment manufacturing cluster which will enable various small enterprises to work together on an order from 
larger firms.  While the specific approach of the BEDCO to this activity was questioned by some, the fact that 
it was seeking to play a role in facilitating linkages of one sort or another suggests that it could play a role in 
future.  Stakeholders pointed out that apart from a lack of direct interest from larger firms there were 
challenges that would be encountered around finance for small firms (World Bank, 2007) and the institutional 
capacity of an entity such as BEDCO.  
                                                                  
24 Salm et al (2002) strongly recommend the setting up of an industry managed training centre. 
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As regards the domestic regulatory framework, the majority of respondents identified that there was no 
mandatory local-content requirement.  Traditionally, exporting firms had sourced their inputs from outside 
Lesotho. Given a general concern that such mandatory local-content requirements would detract from 
Lesotho’s ability to attract FDI some suggested an incentive programme of sorts as an alternative. Such 
incentives could also help raise the local content of a range of other investment fields such as tourism and 
infrastructure development.  The government has already abolished corporate manufacturing tax for 
companies that export their produce outside the SACU region in an effort to sustain competitiveness of the 
investment location.  It was the view of the LTEA that the government could extend this incentive in some 
way to support greater linkage activity. 
In conclusion, the government of Lesotho sees itself as having to try and balance a range of objectives 
associated with attracting and maintaining FDI.  At the time of this study growing the absolute level of FDI, 
expanding exports and increasing employment were the chief concerns.  However, there were indications 
that the Lesotho government is cautiously considering its options for supporting linkage activities but the 
signals from policymakers have not translated into any significant action yet. The survival of the Lesotho 
garment manufacturing industry, post-2012 lies in regional integration and the ability of Lesotho to gain a foot 
hold in the SADC market and particularly in the South African market.  Proximity to regional buyers, smaller 
production runs and better relationships with regionally based related and supporting industries could allow 
scope for more Basotho owned enterprises to supply into this market than is presently possible with the 
dominant exports to the US market. A regionally driven linkages programme would also need to consciously 
address issues related to costs, lead times, quality, and dissemination of buyer/agent related information and 
clustering. 
It is also important to note that investors in Lesotho’s garment and apparel sector have generated linkages in 
a wide range of services that were previously provided on only a limited basis by local firms. These services 
range from accommodation provision, legal and business administration services, transportation, waste 
services, and a variety of other activities.  These have not been the result of any particular set of 
interventions but could also form and important and relevant basis for exploration in future initiatives in that 
they have a genuine market foundation. 
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6.  Lessons learned from the linkage 
experiences in the South Africa, Mozambique 
and Lesotho case studies 
A core message from the analysis of the three case studies is that linkage activity between TNCs and local 
firms requires active facilitation processes and the support of a range of institutional parties.  While it is true 
that in some cases these linkages developed of their own accord, several TNC representatives indicated that 
widening the net of beneficiaries of such linkages required some carefully conceived, planned and executed 
interventions.  In a context such as Lesotho, where there was limited policy focus on linkage creation and 
interest by most apparel investors in developing relationships with the narrow band of local SMEs, evidence 
of observed linkage activity was deemed, by all role players interviewed, to be very limited. The Mozambique 
and South Africa cases, on the other hand, demonstrated growth in linkage activity arising from targeted 
interventions that emphasised collaboration between various role players to optimise the potential “window of 
opportunity” from major FDI thrusts by TNCs.  
Firm dynamics are also important to the process of stakeholder collaboration. In the case of South Africa and 
Mozambique, the presence of lead TNC firms facilitated the establishment of stakeholder forums and 
channels for regular dialogue between the TNCs, government and local SMEs. In the case of Lesotho, the 
clothing and textile industry is characterised by a large number of firms with decision-making capacity based 
overseas. Moreover, in the South African and Mozambican case studies, the lead firms were able to identify 
an advantage to procuring inputs and services from local supply chains. In Lesotho, firm managers indicated 
that there is relatively limited scope for engaging with local SMEs for either services or procurement, and that 
this is in large part due to the nature of global sourcing practices.    
The context in which TNCs invest in host countries is also important to the promotion of linkages and, as is 
demonstrated in the summary matrix which follows, the circumstances in all three cases differed markedly. 
Under these conditions any reading of the lessons and their potential applicability to other circumstances 
would need some significant interrogation in relation to the specificities of the country: its level of economic 
activity, the density and capabilities of local firms, levels of trust between major role players and many other 
factors.  A major capital investment by a single major global player such as BHP Billiton in the Mozal project 
introduces very different dynamics in the host country, some of which are conducive to the exploitation of 
local linkage activities. The South African case on the other hand suggests that even where firms effectively 
participating in global value chains face major obstacles; these can be overcome by a confluence of 
government policy, TNC strategic intent and facilitated inter-firm collaborative learning. 
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Drawing from the case studies it is clear that a number of factors deserve some attention should host 
countries seek to encourage greater levels of local linkages in the process of securing investment.  In 
particular the Mozambican and South African experiences suggest the considerable benefit that can accrue, 
in terms of domestic firm opportunities, from carefully framed linkages support policies and programmes that 
accompany foreign-direct investment oriented frameworks.  This absence of explicit linkages policy and 
programmes appears to substantially reduce prospects of converting gains in increased foreign direct 
investment into deeper productive gains as demonstrated in the Lesotho case. 
The cases of more successful linkages programmes suggest that it is imperative that initiatives undertaken 
to support linkages are generated through some form of compact involving the specific TNCs, local firms and 
host country governments or their specific agencies.  The involvement of all parties in the conceptualisation, 
design and implementation ensures that activities respond to the varied needs of the stakeholders and has 
the added potential of unlocking resource commitments from TNCs and other entities.  The introduction of 
discussions of linkage processes at the outset of TNC investment decision making processes is important to 
secure early commitment and offers the potential to mobilise linkages in the establishment phases of major 
investments which can be reworked to meet future operating requirements once a plant is up and running.  
Respondents in the Lesotho case suggested that where more powerful global value chain operators are one 
step removed from investment (such as in the production of garments for global retailers) the involvement of 
such stakeholders could offer an important source of leverage with out-sourced intermediaries. 
Furthermore, it is demonstrated in the cases that encouraging forms of inter-firm networking amongst 
prospective host country suppliers provides a solid platform for programmes and critically allows for a more 
effective learning and upgrading dynamic to be encouraged.  Even suppliers that have little in common in 
terms of their processes or products can learn a great deal from one another when faced with challenges 
such as those related to meeting supply qualification requirements of a TNC. 
The following lessons summary matrix should not be seen simply as a checklist of success factors but also 
understood within the unique circumstances of each country and influenced heavily by the dynamics of the 
sectors concerned, both domestically and globally. 
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linkages and has no 
programmes in this 
field.  Some efforts 









overseas and the 
tentative nature of the 
TNC presence (AGOA 
dependent) has 
resulted in few 
significant linkage 
efforts that stakeholders 
are aware of.  However, 
linkages have emerged 
through growing 
demand for services 
such as transport, 




Most enterprises in this 
field are informal or 
micro-businesses with 
little experience of 
contractual supply 
relationships at scale.  
Some host country 
SMEs have emerged in 
business services (tax, 
legal and accounting), 
packaging and transport. 
Focus areas have 
included investment 
climate issues largely 
related to regulatory 
matters (eg World Bank), 
institutional capacity 
development around trade 
(DFID, ITIC, original 
framing of AGOA (US 
government and USAID, 
decent work and 
enterprise competitiveness 
(ILO), business 
development for local 
enterprises (DFID), 
infrastructure and capacity 
(MCA). 
Baseline circumstances matter: a limited presence of 
active local SMEs and lack of manufacturing for export 
culture means there is not much to work with in terms of 
productive capacity. 
Government priorities are relevant – if government is not 
significantly interested it is unlikely to see significant 
programmes emerge or pilots succeed. 
Lead FDI firms must set an example and take initiative 
or programmes will have little chance of getting off the 
ground. 
A coherent support framework for SME development is 
important to help move beyond necessary conditions 
(existence of FDI and a supportive environment) to 
generate sufficient conditions (eg finance). 
Sectors are important: The particular pattern of garment 
investment (local branches of vertically integrated Asian 
production facilities) and end market issues (scale of 
orders and lack of access to buyers) does not 
necessarily support local linkage formation. 
Culture and language can create obstacles and need 
specific attention despite being viewed as “soft issues”. 
Limited government capacity requires focus on core 
issues that might be undermined by a broadening of the 
development agenda to issues such as linkages.  
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(but not always 
indigenous) 
firms selected 
to participate in 
linkages 
programme. 
A priority focus area for 
government agency 
(CPI) and supported by 
a high level of political 
endorsement.  
Government depends 
heavily on programme 
delivery by private 
partners. 
Mozal initiated business 
linkage activities initially 
around plant set-up and 
subsequently around 
operations.  
Commitment of senior 
management, staff and 
resources supported by 
experience of BHP 
plants in Richards Bay 
(South Africa). 
Existing SMEs in 
manufacturing and 
services sectors 
displayed eagerness to 
participate in programme 
Significant multi-lateral 
presence in country with 
strong focus on improving 
private sector conditions 
and encouraging FDI 
(World Bank and IFC). 
Considerable number of 
independent reviews of 
projects (eg IDRC) 
The scale of investment and the existence of a 
singular dominant project gets attention and 
creates ongoing opportunities at scale as well as 
political requirement to show local impact from 
special offer arrangements to TNCs. 
Evidence of a track record of supplier development 
elsewhere by the TNC (in other FDI projects) and a 
commitment to take risks and use own resources 
to drive a project was deemed to be important.  For 
example Billiton’s involvement as a trainer and 
certifier ensures product and processes meet 
customer standards. 
Supplier requirements aligned with capabilities 
beyond the country – in the region (eg South 
Africa) 
Timing can be important with projects occurring at 
a time of increasing margins and growing output 
volumes lending themselves more to local linkage 
formation to allow improved market turnaround 
times. 
Measurement of impact has been important to 
secure commitment of various role players to 
expanding the project and involving other TNCs. 
The creation of networking forums such as that 
with financial institutions ensures that other factors 
impacting on SMEs are attended to through 
appropriate channels. 
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Programme) seeks to 
combine FDI attraction 
and local sourcing 
opportunities.  National 
policy related to Broad 
Based Black Economic 
Empowerment place 
pressure on all sectors 
to increase sourcing 
from emerging 
enterprises and existing 
black owned 
businesses.  
Notable support from 
local government in 
encouraging localised 
inter-firm collaboration 
around an agenda set 
by firms. 
TSA had a track record 
as a company 
operating in a protected 
domestic market of 
seeking long term 
relationships with local 
suppliers.  TMC saw 
the relatively high 
proportion of existing 
local suppliers as an 
advantage for market 
access to the European 
market. 
Local SMEs and those 
linked to TNC suppliers 
committed to collaborate 




benchmarking and other 
forms of collaborative 
learning. 
No significant involvement 
apart from initial research 
support form firm 
collaboration from DFID. 
A clear, predictable and supportive government 
macro-policy framework (sector specific, trade 
and investment) allows for FDI firms to make 
decisions on longer term local sourcing 
commitments. 
Active participation and leadership from a 
network of relatively sophisticated firms 
provides a solid base for local collaborative 
action. 
A TNC strategy that prioritises a certain level of 
strategic local sourcing supported by a history of 
relationships and technical support enhances 
trust. 
A preparedness of government at all levels of 
recognise the importance of firm-related 
competitiveness matters as being at the heart of 
a process is essential to ensure positive 
impacts are felt in the firms in the early stages 
and on an ongoing basis. 
Independent facilitators with a reputation 
amongst role players can be essential in 
overcoming mistrust.  
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7.  Concluding remarks: creating TNC FDI 
and domestic SME linkages   
Many SADC countries have in recent years experienced a sustained higher level of FDI.  This has been 
closely associated with high levels of global demand – and the related higher prices – of commodities that 
had for many years previously suffered from weak or very erratic demand.  To a large degree the investment 
associated with the extraction and export, and in some cases the limited processing, of these commodities 
has involved significant FDI by established and emerging Transnational Corporations.  The scale of these 
projects and the related requirements on the host countries - in policy and infrastructure terms to respond to 
the TNC needs - has not always seen attention to the possibilities that might exist in trying to secure direct 
benefits to domestic businesses from the investment process and subsequent operations.  Even in South 
Africa where there has been considerable ongoing experience among policymakers and firms interacting 
over FDI, opportunities an explicit focus on linkages has not always been guaranteed. 
The case studies demonstrate that, whether it be at a national policy level (in Mozambique) or through a 
combination of sensitive national policy frameworks and robust local inter-firm networking (in the case of 
South Africa’s automotive sector) possibilities do exist to carve out opportunities for linkages that have the 
potential to deepen gains from FDI.  The absence of such intent, from both government and TNC investors, 
as in the case of Lesotho, can limit opportunity for linkages to be developed – beyond the indirect, although 
admittedly important, gains from linkages in related and supporting industries such as transport and business 
services.  Furthermore, both the Mozambique and Lesotho cases suggest that regional market links within 
SADC can provide some important opportunities for realising linkages benefits in a context where the 
individual countries might not have the density and depth of enterprises and markets that might be deemed 
important.  Linkage experience with TNCs and local SMEs in a number of SADC countries, including but not 
limited to the case studies discussed in this article, provide a solid basis for informing such future 
explorations. 
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